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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that innovation is geographically concen-
trated, but whether localised knowledge spillovers provide a logically
valid explanation for this phenomenon is unclear. I show that in the
context of cost-reducing R&D spillovers between Cournot oligopolists
the explanation is plausible: localised knowledge spillovers encourage
agglomeration, but whether this leads to higher levels of effective R&D
depends on the extent of the spillovers, the number of firms, and the
industry’s R&D efficiency. Contrary to the earlier theoretical work,
∗I would like to thank David Collie, Huw Dixon, Marco Marinucci, Juuso Va¨lima¨ki, two
anonymous referees, and the seminar audiences at Cardiff University, The RSA Conference
in Manchester, The Geography of Innovation Conference in Utrecht, and Industrial Or-
ganization: Theory, Empirics and Experiments Workshop in Alberobello for their helpful
comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are my own.
†Contact information: Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive,
Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK; Tel. +44(0)29 2087 6530; Email: leppalasm@cardiff.ac.uk
1
this illustrates a context, in which the localised knowledge spillover
explanation is actualised, and provides necessary conditions, which
can be empirically tested.
JEL classification: L13, O33, R32.
Keywords : agglomeration economies, innovation, R&D spillovers, location.
1 Introduction
Following the seminal research by Glaeser et al. (1992), there have been many
empirical studies on the geography of innovation.1 While some issues are still
unclear, such as the role of industrial structure (Beaudry and Schiffauerova,
2009), there is definitive evidence that innovation is geographically concen-
trated (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Feldman and Kogler, 2010). This outcome
is typically attributed to localised knowledge spillovers, which are strongly
bounded in space (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Do¨ring and Schnellenbach,
2006). These spillovers are considered to induce agglomeration and thereby
innovation in these locations. However, the empirical studies have been criti-
cised due to the lack of a firm theoretical background and any direct evidence
of spillovers (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001), which is problematic because there
are various possible explanations for agglomeration economies (Rosenthal
and Strange, 2004).
1One survey (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009) and another meta-analysis (De Groot
et al., 2015) considered 67 and 73 studies, respectively.
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In contrast to empirical research, there has been little theoretical re-
search into localised knowledge spillovers. Moreover, the theoretical basis of
the localised knowledge spillover explanation of geographically concentrated
innovation is far from definite. Since spillovers in the form of involuntary
leakages to rivals increase the dissemination of R&D but also decrease the
incentives to invest in it, the overall effect on both location choice and in-
novation is ambiguous. A few previous studies have considered endogenous,
location-dependent spillovers in the context of Bertrand or Cournot competi-
tion (e.g. Van Long and Soubeyran, 1998; Baranes and Tropeano, 2003; Piga
and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005), but they provide no clear support for the lo-
calised knowledge spillover explanation. Therefore, it needs to be addressed
whether firms would choose to locate in close proximity in order to maximise
spillovers, and if such agglomeration would lead to higher R&D levels and
growth in output without explicit cooperation in R&D. As noted by several
authors, among the micro-foundations of urban agglomeration, learning and
knowledge spillovers are the least understood and there is urgent need for
theoretical research, which informs empirical research rather than lags behind
it (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Fujita and Krugman, 2004; Puga, 2010).
Localised knowledge spillovers can explain geographically concentrated
innovation only if 1) localised spillovers promote agglomeration, and 2) ag-
glomeration leads to a higher effective R&D output. If the first condition does
not hold, then the explanation for agglomeration needs to be sought from
other factors, such as labour market sorting or spinoff formation (Combes
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et al., 2008; Golman and Klepper, 2016). If the second condition does not
hold, then the increase in innovation must come from elsewhere, such as
labour mobility or R&D cooperation (Simonen and McCann, 2008). In this
paper I present the first model that supports the localised knowledge spillover
explanation. Furthermore, by identifying the conditions under which the ex-
planation is sound it provides a way to empirically discriminate between the
alternative explanations for geographically concentrated innovation.
In the model, I focus on output spillovers of cost-saving technology be-
tween non-cooperative Cournot oligopolists. Following empirical research, I
assume that the extent of spillovers depends on the spatial proximity between
firms. I do not consider the specific spillover mechanism, university-industry
spillovers, or other agglomeration economies or diseconomies. The modelling
choices are made in order to isolate the effect of localised knowledge spillovers
and to demonstrate that circumstances where it leads to both agglomeration
and more effective R&D exist. The results extend to other cases where firms
choose R&D spillover rates non-cooperatively.
The model shows that agglomeration is always an equilibrium for any
n ≥ 3 firms, irrespective of the agglomeration spillover rate. However, ag-
glomeration does not lead to higher effective R&D if the spillover rate is too
high. The number of firms and R&D efficiency affect this threshold, which
suggests that different industries benefit more than others from agglomer-
ation. In addition to the agglomeration spillover rate, concentration, and
R&D efficiency, empirical research should pay more attention to the type of
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spillovers and the employed R&D proxies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
basic models of knowledge spillovers and their extensions to the context
of location choice. Based on these insights, Section 3 presents a Cournot
oligopoly model, which provides a suitable framework for examining the lo-
calised knowledge spillover explanation. Finally, I summarise the results in
Section 4 and provide suggestions for future research.
2 Literature Review
Since the research on localised knowledge spillovers and agglomeration has
been largely empirically orientated, the theoretical basis must be sought from
elsewhere.2 As Iammarino and McCann (2006, 1024) note, “understanding
the reasons why particular observed clusters exist requires a careful consid-
eration of central issues in industrial organisation”. There have been numer-
ous studies of knowledge spillovers in the industrial organisation literature
(De Bondt, 1997; Sena, 2004). Two seminal studies on the effect of knowl-
edge spillovers on R&D incentives are d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Kamien et al. (1992), in which the R&D spillovers are formalised by the
2Reviews of the empirical literature are provided in Breschi and Lissoni (2001); Asheim
and Gertler (2005); Do¨ring and Schnellenbach (2006); Beaudry and Schiffauerova (2009);
Feldman and Kogler (2010); De Groot et al. (2015).
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effective R&D equation:
Xi = xi + β
∑
j 6=i
xj,
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the spillover rate between firms.3 xi in d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) is firm i’s own R&D output, which together with the
spillovers from other firms forms its effective R&D output, Xi. In Kamien
et al. (1992), however, these are investments in R&D, i.e., self-financed and
effective, respectively. The R&D output in both cases is typically considered
to be a cost reduction, but the logic is similar for quality-enhancing R&D.
Despite the similarities, the outcomes of these models differ in some rel-
evant respects and previous studies have discussed their relative merits (see
Amir, 2000; Amir et al., 2008). For example, Amir (2000) considered the ad-
ditive spillovers of the output spillover model to be less realistic, but noted
that these might be appropriate in some cases, especially when modelling
agglomeration economies that assume additive benefits. One way of un-
derstanding the difference between these two processes is whether the firms
jointly refine the same technology or if they develop different but additive
technologies.4
The implications of the models for empirical research are as follows. Both
models predict that the firms’ R&D efforts decrease in the spillover rate β.
3For a discussion of other functional forms and their implications, see Knott et al.
(2009).
4Note that, by construction, both models ignore the risk of duplication.
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The same holds for the the effective R&D, Xi, if the spillovers are in inputs,
whereas the maximum effective R&D is reached when β = 0.5 in the case
of output spillovers.5 As such, some degree of imperfection in the spillovers
is important. Therefore, it should be important whether the R&D variable
employed measures a firm’s self-financed or effective R&D. Furthermore, in-
put spillovers are not likely to explain the spatial concentration of innovation
because after controlling for other influences higher spillovers always lead to
less R&D, however measured.
Whether the spillovers occur in R&D outputs or inputs may vary be-
tween industries and this is ultimately an empirical question concerning the
additivity of different inventions. However, my aim is only to test whether
the proposed explanation is logically valid. Therefore, my model employs
the approach of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) because it is the most
favourable of the two cases. However, we can expect the agglomeration
spillover rate to play a critical role. Similarly, I utilise a Cournot model,
because spillovers can only decrease the R&D levels in a homogeneous good
price competition.
The spillover rate creates opposing efficiency and incentive effects and
previous studies have shown that while firms prefer to minimise leakage to
their rivals unilaterally, they would choose extremal spillovers cooperatively
(Poyago-Theotoky, 1999; Amir et al., 2003). This makes it interesting to see
how spillovers affect non-cooperative location choices. One way of combin-
5De Bondt et al. (1992) proved that the latter result holds for any number of firms n.
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ing knowledge spillovers with location choice is to introduce them into the
Hotelling model. A few studies have employed this approach but the equilib-
rium outcomes varied between agglomeration and dispersion, depending on
the model characteristics (Mai and Peng, 1999; Piga and Poyago-Theotoky,
2005; Li and Zhang, 2013). However, the Hotelling model has two unwanted
characteristics given our aims. First, a linear city is not likely to be a suitable
model for representing the empirical findings on the differences between pe-
ripheries and cities. Second, in the Hotelling model, the location choice also
affects the market shares as well as the spillover rate. There are certainly
centripetal and centrifugal forces other than localised knowledge spillovers
(see Fujita and Krugman, 2004; Fujita and Thisse, 2013), but the aim here is
to establish whether it is logically true that these spillovers provide a reason
to agglomerate in the absence of interfering factors.
With respect to non-Hotelling approaches, some previous studies consid-
ered whether two firms choosing to locate in the same region might lead to
spillovers. In Alsleben (2005), labour poaching, which occurs when firms are
located in the same region, leads firms to choose dispersion. By contrast,
in Baranes and Tropeano (2003), selecting the same location created more
competition and made the firms more willing to share their R&D. However,
knowledge that is fully embodied in human capital or the voluntary sharing
of R&D does not conform with the strict meaning of knowledge spillovers
because no externalities are involved (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Other
existing papers that employ a similar discrete location choice approach are
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likewise limited in addressing the localised knowledge spillover explanation of
spatially concentrated innovation by concentrating on the location choice and
keeping the R&D investment decisions exogenous (Gersbach and Schmutzler,
1999; Fosfuri and Rønde, 2004; Combes and Duranton, 2006).
In three papers, which are most closely related to my approach, the firms
choose the distance (or the level of technological differentiation) between each
other, which then determines the spillover rates (but not other market fac-
tors). In Van Long and Soubeyran (1998), three firms choose to agglomerate
given any level of R&D investments when the (input) spillover effect is convex
in distance. However, the study does not reveal how agglomeration affects
the R&D levels, which could also affect the location choices subsequently. In
Gil Molto´ et al. (2005), a duopoly model is employed where the R&D levels
are endogenous.6 The study shows that firms maximise or almost maximise
the spillovers depending on the R&D efficiency and the highest attainable
spillover rate. In addition, it was shown that the spillover choice leads to a
decrease in R&D propensity, xi, but the impact on the effective R&D, Xi,
was not considered.
Importantly, a duopoly model is unable to determine whether there is an
agglomeration equilibrium with more than two firms where one firm’s deci-
sion to deviate does not affect the spillover rates between the other firms.
A three-firm oligopoly is considered in Mota and Branda˜o (2004), but un-
6While the endogenous (output) spillover rate depends on technological differentiation
in their model, the situation is similar if this is caused by the distance between the firms.
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fortunately their simplifying assumption of the identical equilibrium R&D
levels is not appropriate if the (output) spillover rates are not identical as
well. By considering this issue and extending the baseline model to an n-firm
Cournot oligopoly, we can study whether agglomeration is an equilibrium and
the circumstances under which it also leads to higher effective R&D. The pre-
vious theoretical models have either been inconsistent with this outcome or
have not studied both aspects of the issue. In contrast, the following model
provides an example where the localised knowledge spillover explanation is
plausible together with necessary conditions for empirical testing.
3 The Model
In this section, we consider a three-stage game between n ≥ 3 Cournot
oligopolists, which produce a homogeneous output. The inverse demand
function is given by P = a − Q, where Q = ∑ni=1 qi is the total quantity
produced and a > Q ≥ 0. The unit cost of firm i, i = 1, ..., n, is ci = c−Xi,
where c is the initial marginal cost, Xi is the effective cost reduction due to
R&D, and a > c > Xi ≥ 0. Hence, I assume that marginal costs are always
positive and that some production takes always place.
A firm’s effective R&D output is
Xi = xi +
∑
j 6=i
β(dij)xj.
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As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the cost of the firm’s own R&D
output xi is quadratic and it is given by
C(xi) =
1
2
γx2i ,
where γ > 0 is an inverse measure of the efficiency of R&D. In particular, γ is
the slope of the marginal R&D cost curve and reflects the R&D cost efficiency
of the industry: the higher the γ, the more expensive it is to reduce costs or
increase quality.
We do not explicitly consider the exact spillover mechanism, but instead
follow the empirical research in assuming that the spillovers are simply de-
creasing in distance. The interest here is on whether, in the absence of any
interfering factors, the consequences of the assumption that the firms can
affect the spillover rate through their choice of location are as presumed.
Hence, the output spillovers from other firms depend on the spillover rate
β(dij), which is a positive and decreasing function of the geographic distance
dij between firms i and j (i 6= j), i.e.,
0 ≤ β(dij) ≤ β¯ ≤ 1,
and β′(dij) < 0 and β(0) = β¯. For convenience, we denote this by βij = β(dij)
and we concentrate on the choice of β while keeping in mind the assumption
that it is chosen indirectly through the choice of distance.
The agglomeration spillover rate β¯ is the upper bound that can be achieved
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by setting the distance to zero and choosing the same location.7 This max-
imal spillover rate can be limited by other factors, such as labour mobility,
technological (dis)similarity, or intellectual property rights.8 Similarly, there
could also be a lower bound to localised knowledge spillovers, but this is
not our concern because we concentrate on the agglomeration case. I as-
sume that the transportation costs and any other costs related directly to
the location choice are zero, thereby allowing us to focus on how localised
knowledge spillovers alone affect the location choice. This implies that the re-
sults can also be extended to other cases of endogenous knowledge spillovers
(c.f. Gil Molto´ et al., 2005).
The timing of the three-stage game is as follows.
1. The firms choose their distance dij from each other and hence the
spillover rate βij between them.
2. The firms choose their own cost reduction levels, xi.
3. The firms choose their output levels, qi, via Cournot competition.
In each stage, the choices are made simultaneously and discounting be-
tween the stages is ignored for simplicity. We solve the game by backward
7Even co-located firms may, of course, have asymmetric spillover rates, which would
typically result from other differences in their relative positions (De Bondt and Henriques,
1995; Vandekerckhove and De Bondt, 2008). However, differences in the realised spillovers
need not imply that the firms expect their spillover rates to be asymmetric.
8The spillover rate may further depend on the firm’s own R&D effort. This absorptive
capacity effect has been shown to increase the firms’ R&D efforts, but leaving the qual-
itative results of the basic model unchanged (Martin, 2002). As such, it is not expected
that absorptive capacity would change the way how localised knowledge spillovers affect
location choice and innovation in this model.
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induction to determine whether agglomeration can be a Nash equilibrium,
which also maximises the firm’s effective R&D. The previous literature al-
ludes that both outcomes are dependent on β¯. Since we do not consider
whether other equilibria exist, I do not need to make any explicit assump-
tions regarding the location space, except that there is at least one dimension,
or the concavity of spillovers in space. Without loss of generality, I will as-
sume that all the other firms except i are agglomerated and we concentrate
on firm i’s location choice.9 Thus, if djk = 0, ∀j, k ∈ {n− i}, j 6= k, which im-
plies βjk = β¯ and βij = βik = β, then we determine the necessary conditions
for β = β¯ to maximise firm i’s effective R&D and profit.
3.1 Production Stage
In the production stage, firm i maximises its profit function, which is given
by
pii = (a−Q− ci)qi.
The Cournot equilibrium output is
q∗i =
a− nci +
∑
j 6=i cj
n+ 1
=
a− c+ nXi −
∑
j 6=iXj
n+ 1
(1)
9This relates to the analysis of the “sustain points” in the new economic geography
literature (Fujita et al., 1999).
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for all firms i ∈ n. The total industry output is
Q =
n(a− c) +∑ni=1Xi
n+ 1
and the consumer surplus is CS = 1
2
Q2. As expected, there is a positive
effect of R&D on the economic activity and welfare since ∂Q/∂Xi > 0.
3.2 R&D Investment Stage
In stage 2, the firms choose their R&D levels. Given the subsequent output
levels, firm i chooses xi in order to maximise
pii = (q
∗
i )
2 − 1
2
γx2i ,
where q∗i is given by equation (1). Assuming that firms other than i are
agglomerated, djk = 0, implies βjk = β¯ and βij = βik = β. The first order
condition gives the best response function
xi(xj) =
2(a− c+ (nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)∑j 6=i xj)(n− (n− 1)β)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)2 (2)
for firm i. This shows us that the R&D outputs xj are strategic substitutes
for xi if nβ− (n− 2)β¯− 1 < 0 and complements if the inequality is reversed.
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Similarly, the best response function for the other firms is
xj(xi, xk) =
2(a− c+ (2β − 1)xi + (3β¯ − β − 1)
∑
xk)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)2
(3)
∀j, k ∈ {n − i}, j 6= k. Hence, the R&D output xi is a strategic substitute
for xj if β < 1/2, and xj and xk are strategic substitutes for each other if
3β¯ − β − 1 < 0.
The second order conditions in the R&D stage require that the numera-
tors in the best response functions are positive. This holds for all β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1]
when γ > 2n2/(n + 1)2. The stability condition requires that the best
response functions cross correctly (Henriques, 1990), which holds for all
β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1] when γ > 2n(2n− 1)/(n+ 1)2.
I assume that firms j 6= i make a symmetric choice: x−i. Then, using
the best response functions (2) and (3), we obtain the following equilibrium
R&D output levels:
x∗i = 2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)
A
C
(4)
and
x∗−i = 2(a− c)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
D
C
, (5)
where
A = (n+ 1)γ − 2(β¯ − 1)(β − β¯)n2 + ((8β + 6)β¯ − 8β¯2 − 2β2 − 2β − 2)n
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+2β + 8β¯2 − (8β + 4)β¯ + 2β2,
C = (8n− 4n2 − 4)β4 + ((16β¯ − 4)n2 − 20β¯n+ (4− 4β¯)n3 + 8β¯)β3
+((2n− 2n3)γ + 8β¯ − 4 + (4− 4β¯)n+ (4− 8β¯)n2 + (4β¯ − 4)n3)β2
+((12β¯ − 20β¯2 − 4)n2 + ((6− 2β¯)n3 − 12β¯ + 4 + 8β¯n2 + (2− 2β¯)n)γ
+(4β¯2 − 4β¯)n3 − 16β¯2 + 8β¯ + (32β¯2 − 12β¯)n)β + (n3 + 3n2 + 3n+ 1)γ2
+((4β¯2 − 4β¯ − 2)n3 + 16β¯2 + (8β¯ − 12β¯2 − 6)n2 + (4β¯ − 4)n− 8β¯)γ
+(16β¯2 − 12β¯ + 4)n2 + (4β¯ − 4β¯2)n3 + (8β¯ − 16β¯2)n,
and
D = (n+ 1)γ − 2n+ (2− 2n)β2 + (4n− 2)β.
The interior and positive solutions for the R&D outputs, particularly that
A > 0, are guaranteed for γ > (n+1)/2, ∀β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1].10 I make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 γ > (n+ 1)/2.
With Assumption 1, I limit the analysis to positive, locally stable equi-
librium values in the R&D investment stage, ruling out either maximal R&D
investments or corner solutions.11
The equilibrium R&D outputs (4) and (5) yield effective cost reductions
10Further details available on request.
11Note that corner solutions could be relevant for studying whether any firm would ever
completely isolate itself.
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Xi = x
∗
i +β(n−1)x∗−i and X−i = (1+ β¯(n−2))x∗−i+βx∗i . The reader should
keep in mind that here β is a function. Now, we proceed to the first main
result.
Proposition 1 Agglomeration leads to higher effective R&D only if the ag-
glomeration spillovers are moderate, i.e., β¯ ≤ βˆ, where βˆ ∈ (n−1
n+1
, n−1
n
)
,
∂βˆ/∂γ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that for low to medium spillovers, firm i’s effective
R&D can be higher if it is agglomerated with the other firms. However,
there is an inverted-U relationship between innovation and agglomeration
spillovers. If the agglomeration spillovers are high, the firm could increase its
effective R&D by not agglomerating with the other firms. In this case, the
increase in own R&D output would compensate for the lower spillovers. Since
this effect depends on the number of firms, n, this provides a moving window
for the critical spillover rate. With a larger number of firms, the higher
rate of agglomeration spillovers would still increase the firm’s effective R&D.
Intuitively, n affects both the quantity of spillovers that a firm can enjoy
as well as the degree of strategic effect that its agglomeration decision has
on the R&D choices of the other firms. As such, the critical spillover rate
is higher for n ≥ 3 firms than in the standard model (c.f. De Bondt et al.,
1992). However, the meaning of βˆ is different. Instead of measuring the
common spillover rate that maximises each firm’s effective R&D, it provides
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an important counterfactual condition, i.e., the spillover rate beyond which
a firm would enjoy higher effective R&D outside the agglomeration. Thus,
the prediction still remains that the highest effective R&D when comparing
across different agglomerations is gained when the agglomeration spillover
rates are exactly intermediate.
To some extent, the effect of agglomeration spillovers depends on R&D
cost efficiency, which determines the critical spillover rate within the bounds.
A larger γ moves the critical rate closer to the upper bound, in which case,
higher agglomeration spillovers increase effective R&D due to cost savings.
However, the magnitude of this effect is small, which is partly a consequence
of Assumption 1. By approximating the bounds for some values of n:
n = 3→ βˆ ∈ (0.6498, 2/3) , n = 5→ βˆ ∈ (0.7796, 0.8)
n = 10→ βˆ ∈ (0.8930, 0.9) , n = 25→ βˆ ∈ (0.9592, 0.96) ,
we can see that they tend to be very close to each other. γ only has a small
effect, so we can say that the critical spillover rate occurs slightly before
(n− 1)/n in general.
Note that not exceeding the critical spillover rate is only a necessary
condition for agglomeration to maximise effective R&D. The sufficient com-
plexity of the effective R&D function makes it infeasible to prove that in
this case agglomeration also ensues the global maximum. However, based
on my numerical computations, it strongly seems to be the case that Xi is
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concave in β over the relevant interval as illustrated in Figure 1.12 Be that as
it may, the main purpose of this paper is to identify necessary conditions of
the localised knowledge spillover explanation, which can then be empirically
tested. One can further observe from Figure 1 how, as the agglomeration
spillover rate, β¯, increases and moves right, the peak of Xi moves left. The
peak is left to β¯ when the latter gets sufficiently high, but a higher n requires
an even higher β¯ for this to take place.
3.3 Location Choice Stage
Although moderate agglomeration spillovers imply higher effective R&D, the
final step is to check the range of agglomeration spillovers β¯ for which ag-
glomeration can be an equilibrium outcome. If the range of spillovers does
not overlap with Proposition 1, then the localised knowledge spillover expla-
nation is not a logically valid even within this model. As before, I assume
that all the other firms are agglomerated and we concentrate on firm i’s de-
cision. Given the anticipated outcome of stages 2 and 3, and the equilibrium
cost reductions (4) and (5), firm i’s profit function in stage 1 is now
pii =
(a− c+ nXi − (n− 1)X−i)2
(n+ 1)2
− 1
2
γ(x∗i )
2
=
(a− c+ (n− (n− 1)β)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)x∗−i)2
(n+ 1)2
− 1
2
γ(x∗i )
2.
(6)
12These patterns are robust to a wide range of variations in parameter values.
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(a) n = 3 and β¯ = 0.4 (b) n = 3 and β¯ = 0.8
(c) n = 5 and β¯ = 0.4 (d) n = 5 and β¯ = 0.8
(e) n = 10 and β¯ = 0.4 (f) n = 10 and β¯ = 0.8
Figure 1: Effective R&D and the spillover rate (with a− c = 10, γ = 6, and
different ns and β¯s).
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This brings us to the final proposition.
Proposition 2 Agglomeration is a possible equilibrium outcome for n firms
given any rate of agglomeration spillovers β¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 means that agglomeration is always a possible outcome,
irrespective of the spillover rate it yields. In the absence of any offsetting
factors13, this holds for any n ≥ 3 firms (cf. Gil Molto´ et al., 2005). As the
agglomeration outcome is not ruled out by any β¯ in the model, the neces-
sary condition as identified in Proposition 1 can be used for testing whether
localised knowledge spillovers explain the spatial concentration of innova-
tion. Note that Proposition 2 claims only that agglomeration maximises the
profit at least locally. Again, the functional complexity of Xi and pii makes it
infeasible to prove that this is also the global maximum. My numerical com-
putations strongly suggest that this is the case, however. Looking at Figure
2, it seems that an increase in n, ceteris paribus, changes the pii(β) function
from concave to convex. In both cases, however, pii is strictly increasing in β
(hence, decreasing in dij) over the relevant interval.
Proposition 2 implies that despite the mixed effects on the effective R&D,
localised knowledge spillovers create a centripetal force for 3 or more firms.
13In addition to any agglomeration diseconomies, asymmetric spillover rates might af-
fect the outcome. If the spillover rates are different enough, we could have a separating
equilibrium where only firms with high incoming and low outgoing spillover rates agglom-
erate (see Livanis and Lamin, 2016). Whether this outcome maximises the effective R&D
of both agglomerated and isolated firms is, nevertheless, likely to depend on how their
weighted average spillover rate compares to the critical rate of Proposition 1.
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(a) n = 3 and β¯ = 0.4 (b) n = 3 and β¯ = 0.8
(c) n = 5 and β¯ = 0.4 (d) n = 5 and β¯ = 0.8
(e) n = 10 and β¯ = 0.4 (f) n = 10 and β¯ = 0.8
Figure 2: Profit and the spillover rate (with a− c = 10, γ = 6, and different
ns and β¯s).
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While a firm wants to minimise the R&D leaked to its rivals, the incentive to
similarly free-ride on their efforts is stronger. It is intuitive that a firm prefers
to agglomerate when this implies higher effective R&D, but it is less obvious
when this does not occur. However, locating outside the agglomeration would
imply less spillovers and more own R&D investment, and hence a lower profit.
Naturally, the presence of congestion or transportation costs, or any other
centripetal or centrifugal forces, would affect the location decision in reality
as well. As such, this suggests that when firms are observed to be dis-
persed this is due to stronger centrifugal forces despite of localised knowl-
edge spillovers. However, Proposition 1 then provides the counterfactual for
assessing whether the dispersed firms would have been more innovative if
agglomerated or the agglomerated firms when dispersed. Therefore, the ag-
glomeration spillover rate, number of firms, and R&D cost efficiency play
important roles in determining whether localised knowledge spillovers ex-
plain the spatial concentration of innovation. Furthermore, these factors
may help to explain the observed differences between industries (Do¨ring and
Schnellenbach, 2006; De Groot et al., 2015).
4 Conclusion
The standard explanation for the pattern of geographically concentrated in-
novation has been localised knowledge spillovers. In the present study, I
analysed the theoretical validity of this explanation in the context of Cournot
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oligopolists. Indeed, it holds that agglomeration is a possible equilibrium out-
come of this model. However, it is not always the case that agglomeration will
also imply higher effective R&D for these firms. Hence, localised knowledge
spillovers may explain geographical concentration of innovation, but certain
conditions still need to be met.
The implications from the theory to empirical research are as follows.
Based on the review of the earlier literature, we conjecture that whether
knowledge spillovers take place in R&D inputs or outputs is likely to be crit-
ical. That is, it is expected that only in industries, in which the technological
space is characterised by additive inventions, can the relationship between lo-
calised knowledge spillovers and innovation be positive. Furthermore, it can
be of great importance whether the employed R&D proxy measures expendi-
tures, own R&D output, or the effective R&D, which also includes spillovers.
Whether these respond similarly or differently to changes in the spilllover
rate may further indicate if the industry is characterised by output or input
spillovers.
The output spillover model analysed in this paper predicts that localised
knowledge spillovers do facilitate agglomeration but that the relationship
with innovation is non-linear. After controlling for other factors, such as
the market size, we would expect agglomerated firms to be more innovative
as long as the agglomeration spillovers are not too high. Furthermore, the
critical spillover rate is conditional on the number of firms and R&D efficiency
such that a higher spillover rate is advantageous if there are more firms or
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the industry’s R&D activities are more costly to perform. All of these factors
are likely to vary among different industries and technologies, and thus they
provide interesting hypotheses for testing in subsequent empirical research.
By isolating localised knowledge spillovers from other interfering factors, I
have provided the first theoretical model that may be able to explain the spa-
tial concentration of innovation. Naturally, there might be other model spec-
ifications with different functional forms, competitive settings, or spillover
mechanisms such as networks, where the explanation can be found to hold
as well. Further theoretical research could also consider the existence of other
equilibria, the impact of R&D cooperation complemented with full welfare
analysis, or inter-industry spillovers, which were not addressed here. Hence,
demand for careful theoretical work as well as theoretically grounded empir-
ical studies exists.
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Appendix A
Several parts of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 rely on the positivity or
negativity of polynomial functions of n. For convenience, we establish these
collectively in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The signs of the polynomials are as follows.
i P1(n) = −3n5 + 19n4 + 23n3 + 133n2 + 132n+ 36 < 0 if n > 8.
ii P2(n) = n
5 + 5n4 − 26n3 + 178n2 − 287n+ 81 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
iii P3(n) = n
3 − n2 − 8n+ 24 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
iv P4(n) = n
5 + 17n4 − 51n3 + 61n2 + 10n− 6 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
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v P5(n) = n
5 + n4 − 9n3 − 17n2 + 128n− 72 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
vi P6(n) = 4n
4 − 41n3 + 33n2 + 141n+ 79 < 0 if n ∈ [4, 8].
vii P7(n) = 25n
7− 141n6+96n5+406n4+261n3− 981n2− 1854n− 884 > 0
if n > 8.
Proof. We use the following two known bounds for the positive roots of
polynomials (see S¸tefa˘nesu et al., 2010). Let
P (n) = a0n
d − b1nd−m1 − · · · − bknd−mk +
∑
j 6=m1,...,mk
ajn
d−j,
with a0 > 0, b1, . . . , bk > 0 and aj ≥ 0 for all j /∈ {b1, . . . , bk}. The numbers
B1(P ) = max
{
(kb1/a0)
1/m1 , . . . , (kbk/a0)
1/mk
}
and
B2(P ) = 2×max
{
(b1/a0)
1/m1 , . . . , (bk/a0)
1/mk
}
are the upper bounds for the positive roots.
i Descartes’ rule of signs states that P1 has only one positive root, which is
between 8 and 9, as P1(8) = 900 and P1(9) = −23724. Therefore, P1 < 0
if n > 8, and positive otherwise.
ii B2(P2) = 10.20. Since the leading coefficient of P2 is positive, P2 > 0
if n ≥ 11. As P2(10) = 139011 > P2(9) = 84816 > P2(8) = 49113 >
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P2(7) = 26688 > P2(6) = 13407 > P2(5) = 6096 > P2(4) = 2421 >
P2(3) = 768 > 0, then P2 > 0 if n ∈ [3, 10].
iii B1(P3) = 4 and P3(4) = 40 > P3(3) = 18 > 0. Since the leading
coefficient is positive, P3 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
iv P4(n) = n
5+17n4−51n3+61n2+10n−6 > (17n4−51n3)+ (10n−6) ≡
P ′4(n). Both 17n
4 − 51n3 > 0 and 10n − 6 > 0 if n > 3 and P ′4(3) = 24.
Therefore, P4 > P
′
4 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
v B1(P5) = 5.20 and P5(5) = 2768 > P5(4) = 872 > P5(3) = 240 > 0.
Since the leading coefficient is positive, P5 > 0 if n ≥ 3.
vi Descartes’ rule of signs states that P6 has two positive roots, which are
between 3 and 4, as P6(3) = 16 and P6(4) = −429, and 8 and 9, as
P6(8) = −1289 and P6(9) = 376. Therefore, P6 < 0 if n ∈ [4, 8], and
positive otherwise.
vii B2(P7) = 11.28 and P7(11) = 259001728 > P7(10) = 122803476 >
P7(9) = 53066752 > 0. Since the leading coefficient is positive, P7 > 0 if
n > 8.
Proof of Proposition 1. The marginal effect of the spillover rate on firm
i’s effective R&D is given by
∂Xi
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− (n− 1)β
C2
(
∂A
∂β
C − A∂C
∂β
)
− (n− 1)A
C
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+
β(n− 1)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
C2
(
∂D
∂β
C −D∂C
∂β
)
+(n− 1)(n− 2β − (n− 2)β¯)D
C
)
,
with
∂A
∂β
= (2− 2β¯)n2 + (8β¯ − 4β − 2)n+ 4β − 8β¯ + 2,
∂C
∂β
= (4β¯2 + (8β − 12β2 − 2γ − 4)β¯ + 12β2 − (4γ + 8)β + 6γ)n3
+((48β2 − 16β + 8γ + 12)β¯ − 20β¯2 − 16β3 − 12β2 + 8β − 4)n2
+(32β¯2 − (60β2 + 8β + 2γ + 12)β¯ + 32β3 + (4γ + 8)β − 2γ)n
−16β¯2 + (24β2 + 16β − 12γ + 8)β¯ − 16β3 − 8β + 4γ,
and
∂D
∂β
= (4− 4n)β + 4n− 2.
When agglomerated with the other firms, dij = 0 and β = β¯, this marginal
effect is non-negative if
∂Xi
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=β¯
=
2γ(a− c)(n2 − 1)f(n, γ, β¯)
((n+ 1)γ − (2n− 2)β¯2 + (4n− 2)β¯ − 2n)E ≥ 0 , (7)
where
f(n, γ, β¯) = (1− β¯)(2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n3 + (1− 2β¯)(16β¯ − 10β¯2 − 6 + γ)n2
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+(56β¯2 − 34β¯3 − (γ + 30)β¯ + 6− γ)n+ 16β¯3 − 18β¯2 + 6β¯ − γ
and
E = ((2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n2 + (4β¯ − 4β¯2 + 2γ − 2)n+ 2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)2.
Clearly, both E > 0 and 2γ(a − c)(n2 − 1) > 0. Given Assumption 1,
(n + 1)γ − (2n − 2)β¯2 + (4n − 2)β¯ − 2n is also always positive. Hence, the
sign of equation (7) depends on the sign of f(n, γ, β¯).
Since f(n, γ, 0) = (n−1)(n2γ+2nγ−6n+γ) > 0, given Assumption 1, and
because f(n, γ, (n−1)/n) = −4(2n−1)(n−1)(n−2)2/n3 < 0, there is at least
one βˆ such that f(n, γ, βˆ) = 0. Furthermore, ∂f/∂γ = (n+1)2(n−1−β¯n) ≥ 0
iff β¯ ≤ (n− 1)/n. As γ > (n+ 1)/2,
∂f
∂β¯
= −6(n− 8)(n− 1)2β¯2 + 4(n− 1)(2n− 1)(n− 9)β¯ − n(n+ 1)2γ
−2n3+28n2−30n+6 > −6(n−8)(n−1)2β¯2+4(n−1)(2n−1)(n−9)β¯−n
2
(n+1)3
−2n3 + 28n2 − 30n+ 6
and the discriminant of this quadratic function,
∆1 = −3n5 + 19n4 + 23n3 + 133n2 + 132n+ 36,
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is negative for n > 8, as shown in Lemma 1. Then, because the leading co-
efficient is also negative, this implies that ∂f/∂β¯ < 0 if n > 8. Furthermore,
for n = 8, ∂f/∂β¯ < −2383− 420β¯ < 0. For n ∈ [3, 7], the leading coefficient
is positive and the roots of the quadratic function are given by
β¯ =
1
6
4n2 − 38n±√∆1 + 18
(n− 8) (n− 1) .
The larger root is greater than 1 when n ∈ [3, 7] and the smaller root is
less than 0 when n ∈ [4, 7]. Therefore, ∂f/∂β¯ < 0 if n > 3. For n = 3,
∂f/∂β¯ < 0 if β¯ ≥ 0.07805. This implies that for n = 3, βˆ is bounded above
at 2/3. By the implicit function theorem,
∂β¯
∂γ
= −∂f/∂γ
∂f/∂β¯
=
8
3
3β¯ − 2
20β¯2 − 40β¯ − 8γ + 19 ≥ 0
if β¯ ∈ [0.07805, 2/3]. Hence, we conclude that there is always exactly one βˆ,
where its higher bound is (n− 1)/n and the lower bound is given by
f
(
n,
n+ 1
2
, βˆ
)
= −2(n− 8)(n− 1)2βˆ3 + 2(n− 1)(2n− 1)(n− 9)βˆ2
−1
2
(n4 + 7n3 − 53n2 + 61n− 12)βˆ + 1
2
(n− 1)(n3 + 3n2 − 9n+ 1) = 0.
Since
f
(
n,
n+ 1
2
,
n− 1
n+ 1
)
=
(n− 1)(n5 + 5n4 − 26n3 + 178n2 − 287n+ 81)
2(n+ 1)3
> 0,
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with n5 + 5n4 − 26n3 + 178n2 − 287n + 81 > 0, as shown in Lemma 1, the
lower bound is greater than (n− 1)/(n+ 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The first order condition of (6) with respect to
β is
∂pii
∂β
=
2(a− c+ (n− (n− 1)β)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)x∗−i)2
(n+ 1)2
×
(
(n− (n− 1)∂x
∗
i
∂β
− (n− 1)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)
∂x∗−i
∂β
+n(n− 1)x∗−i
)
− γx∗i
∂x∗i
∂β
with
∂x∗i
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− (n− 1)β
C2
(
∂A
∂β
C − A∂C
∂β
)
− (n− 1)A
C
)
and
∂x∗−i
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
C2
(
∂D
∂β
C −D∂C
∂β
)
+
D
C
)
.
Agglomeration, where dij = 0 and β = β¯, is an equilibrium only if the
marginal profit of agglomeration spillovers is non-negative, i.e.,
∂pii
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=β¯
=
4(n− 1)γ(a− c)2h(n, γ, β¯)
((n+ 1)γ + (2− 2n)β¯2 + (4n− 2)β¯ − 2n)G ≥ 0 (8)
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where
G = ((2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n2 − (4β¯2 − 4β¯ − 2γ − 2)n+ 2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)3
and
h(n, γ, β¯) = (1− β¯)(2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)(4β¯ − 2β¯2 + γ − 2)n5
−(28β¯5 − 100β¯4 + 136β¯3 − (2γ + 88)β¯2 + (γ2 + 28)β¯ − 2γ2 + 2γ − 4)n4
+(72β¯5 − 208β¯4 + (20γ + 216)β¯3 − (42γ + 96)β¯2 + (26γ + 16)β¯ + γ2 − 6γ)n3
−(88β¯5− 184β¯4+ (20γ +120)β¯3− (10γ +24)β¯2+ (4γ2− 10γ)β¯− γ2+4γ)n2
+(52β¯5 − 64β¯4 − (20γ − 16)β¯3 + 44β¯2γ − (7γ2 + 18γ)β¯ + 2γ2 + 2γ)n
(2β¯3 − 3β¯γ + 1γ)(2β¯ − 6β¯2 + γ).
Clearly, 4(n− 1)γ(a− c)2 > 0. Given Assumption 1, (n+1)γ+(2− 2n)β¯2+
(4n − 2)β¯ − 2n and G are always positive. Hence, the sign of equation (8)
depends on the sign of h(n, γ, β¯).
At the end points,
h(n, γ, 0) = (γ2−2γ)n5+(2γ2−2γ+4)n4+(γ2−6γ)n3+(γ2−4γ)n2+(2γ2+2γ)n+γ2
> h(n, γ, 1) = γ2n4+(γ2−2γ)n3−(3γ2+4γ)n2−(5γ2−8γ−4)n−2γ2+10γ−8 > 0,
38
given Assumption 1. β¯ = 1 is not the argument that minimises h(n, γ, β¯)
only if h(n, γ, β¯) is convex downward.
The second derivative of h(n, γ, β¯) is:
∂2h
∂2β¯
= 4(n− 1)((20n4 − 120n3 + 240n2 − 200n+ 60)β¯3
−(48n4−252n3+372n2+180n−12)β¯2+(36n4−168n3+30n2γ+156n2−24n−30γ)β¯
−n4γ − 8n4 + 36n3 − 21n2γ − 12n2 − 16nγ + 6γ) ≡ h′′.
Note that
∂h′′
∂γ
= −4(n2 − 1)(n3 − n2 − 30nβ¯ + 22n+ 30β¯ − 6) < 0,
since n3−n2− 30nβ¯+22n+30β¯− 6 ≥ n3−n2− 8n+24 > 0, as established
in Lemma 1. Therefore,
h′′ < 2(n− 1)(40(n− 3)(n− 1)3)β¯3 − 24(4n2 − 13n+ 1)(n− 1)2β¯2
+6(n−1)(12n3−39n2+18n+5)β¯−n5−17n4+51n3−61n2−10n+6 ≡ h¯′′,
where γ = (n + 1)/2. When n = 3, h¯′′ becomes a quadratic function that is
always negative:
h¯′′ = 768β¯2 + 1536β¯ − 3264 < 0.
39
h¯′′ is also negative at both end points:
β¯ = 0→ h¯′′ = −2(n− 1)(n5 + 17n4 − 51n3 + 61n2 + 10n− 6) < 0,
and
β¯ = 1→ h¯′′ = −2(n− 1)(n5 + n4 − 9n3 − 17n2 + 128n− 72) < 0,
as shown in Lemma 1. Differentiating h¯′′ with respect to β¯ gives a
quadratic equation,
∂h¯′′
∂β¯
= 12(n−1)2(20(n−3)(n−1)2β¯2−8(4n2−13n+1)(n−1)β¯+12n3−39n2+18n+5,
(9)
with solutions
β¯ =
8n2 − 26n±√∆2 + 2
10 (n− 3) (n− 1) . (10)
For n ∈ [4, 8], the discriminant,
∆2 = 4n
4 − 41n3 + 33n2 + 141n+ 79,
is negative, as shown in Lemma 1, and h¯′′ has no local maximum. Since the
leading coefficient of equation (9) is positive for n > 3, the local maximum
for n > 8 is given by the smaller value of equation (10). At this point, h¯′′ is
− 2(n− 1)
25(n− 3)2 (25n
7 − 141n6 + 96n5 − (12
√
∆2 − 406)n4 + (123
√
∆2 + 261)n
3
40
−(99
√
∆2 + 981)n
2 − (423
√
∆2 + 1854)n+∆
( 3
2
)
2 − 237
√
∆2 − 884).
and decreasing in ∆2, and thus it is less than
− 2(n− 1)
25(n− 3)2 (25n
7−141n6+96n5+406n4+261n3−981n2−1854n−884) < 0,
given the sign of 25n7−141n6+96n5+406n4+261n3−981n2−1854n−884,
as shown in Lemma 1. Since h′′ < h¯′′ < 0, h(γ, β¯) is concave and always
positive, as is then the marginal profit of agglomeration spillovers.
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